In the last thirty years, work in analytic philosophy of art has flourished, and it has given rise to considerably controversy. Stephen Davies describes and analyzes the definition of art as it has been discussed in Anglo-American philosophy during this period and, in the process, introduces his own perspective on ways in which we should reorient our thinking. Davies conceives of the debate as revealing two basic, conflicting approaches--the functional and the procedural--to the questions of whether art can be (...) defined, and if so, how. As the author sees it, the functionalist believes that an object is a work of art only if it performs a particular function (usually, that of providing a rewarding aesthetic experience). By contrast the proceduralist believes that something is an artwork only if it has been created according to certain rules and procedures. Davies attempts to demonstrate the fruitfulness of viewing the debate in terms of this framework, and he develops new arguments against both points of view--although he is more critical of functional than of procedural definitions. Because it has generated so much of the recent literature, Davies starts his analysis with a discussion of Morris Weitz's germinal paper, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." He goes on to examine other important works by Arthur Danto, George Dickie, and Ben Tilghman and develops in his critiques original arguments on such matters of the artificiality of artworks and the relevance of artists' intentions. (shrink)

STEPHEN TOULMIN George Santayana used to insist that those who are ignorant of the history of thought are doomed to re-enact it. To this we can add a corollary: that those who are ignorant of the context of ideas are doom ed to misunderstand them. In a few self-contained fields such as pure mathematics, concepts and conceptual systems can perhaps be de tached from their historico-cultural situations; so that (for instance) a self-taught Ramanujan, living alone in India, mastered (...) number theory to a point at which he could make major contributions to European mathematics. But elsewhere the situation is different - and, in philosophy, inevitably so. For philosophical ideas and problems confront us like geological specimens in situ; and, in the act of prising them free from their historical and cultural locations, we can too easily forget about the matrix in which they took shape, and end by impossing on them a sculptural form of our own making. Something of this kind has happened in the case of Ludwig Wittgen stein. For his philosophical work has commonly been seen as an episode in the development, either of mathematicallogic, or oftwentieth-century British philosophy. His associations with Frege and Russell, Moore and Waismann, have over-shadowed everything else in his cultural origins and intellectual concerns. (shrink)

An important short study of Nietzsche by the famed European critic. Included are selections from the Brandes-Nietzsche correspondence.

Hegel's Philosophy of right concerns ideas on justice, moral responsibility, family life, economic activity and the political structure of the state. He shows how human freedom involves living with others in accordance with publicly recognized rights and laws.

Religion and intelligence.--The philosophic theory of knowledge.--The absolute object of intelligence.--The Biblical theory of knowledge.--Biblical ontology: the absolute.--Biblical ontology: the world.--Biblical ontology: man.--Comparative philosophic content of Christianity.

Introduction.--Biographical notes.--General analysis of knowledge and the act.--Perceptual and manipulatory phases of the act.--Cosmology.--Value and the act.--Supplementary essays.

Why is common priors are implicit or explicit in the vast majority of the differential information literature in economics and game theory? Why has the economic community been unwilling, in practice, to accept and actually use the idea of truly personal probabilities in much the same way that it did accept the idea of personal utility functions? After all, in, both the utilities and probabilities are derived separately for each decision maker. Why were the utilities accepted as personal, and the (...) probabilities not? (shrink)

Although social contracts theory has been applied to organizations (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), rarely has the theory been tested empirically. This article uses the traditions of communitarianism and individualism to instantiate an ideal-type economic social contract. We asked 269 subjects to complete the Ideological Orientation Scale and to make judgments on eight downsizing scenarios. Using social judgment theory, we assess the direct and indirect influences of ideology on judgments of fairness. Our findings suggest that ideology indeed shapes individual’s conceptions of (...) organizational fairness. (shrink)

A benchmark volume for an emerging field where mental disorders serve as the springboard for philosophical insights.

We describe here recent work on the molecular genetics of mitosis in the filamentous fungus Aspergillus nidulans. Aspergillus is one of three simple eukaryotes with powerful genetic systems that have been used to analyze mitosis. The modern molecular biological techniques available with this organism have made it possible to use mutations to identify genes and proteins that play an important role in mitosis. Three Aspergillus genes that affect mitosis are described. One gene, nimA, is specifically expressed late in the cell (...) cycle and codes for a putative protein kinase that induces mitosis, even in cells blocked in S‐phase. The second gene, bimG, codes for a putative phosphatase that interacts functionally with the nimA kinase. The third gene, bimE, codes for a protein that suppresses mitosis during interphase, apparently by keeping nimA turned off. None of these genes appear to be similar to any of the genes affecting mitosis that have been characterized in other eukaryotes, but rather appear to be elements of a system that prevents mitosis from occurring during interphase. (shrink)

An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness.".

The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which (...) put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach. (shrink)

IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond Reference Model, directly overlays events in the power grid with communication performance on the same spacetime model, it ensures a perspective that verifies that any of the myriad of communication technologies chosen will provide the required support for the Smart Grid. For Corporate or Institutional Access, request a custom quote for your organization at www.ieee.org/smartgridresearch.

This IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond Roadmap is a high-levelsupplement of the full vision document IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 andBeyond. Communication is a major enabling technology for the Smart Grid. We believe that the powergrid will tend to utilize advances in communications since the data exchange requirements willscale up for the Smart Grid. Smart Grid communication will help to improve demand forecasting,enable self-healing from power disturbance events, facilitate active participation by consumers in demand-response (...) mechanisms, and provide resilience against physical and cyber attacks. Smart Grid communication will also help to improve quality of power, allow easy integration of renewable energy sources into the grid, foster innovation to enable new products, services, and markets, assist in optimization of assets, and improve operating efficiency. (shrink)

While increasing numbers of philosophers have argued for eliminating the retributivist elements of criminal justice systems, their arguments often fall short due to internal inconsistency. Some of the best known of these arguments — such as those provided by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso — rely on the claim that there are moral grounds for rejecting retributivism. In defending this claim, these philosophers typically provide arguments seeking to undermine the type of agent responsibility that they believe is needed to justify (...) retributivism. This is usually followed by an assertion that since the excessive suffering caused by retributivist punishment cannot be justified, it is therefore immoral to preserve remnants of it in our criminal justice systems. This paper — which opposes the moral case against retributivism provided by Pereboom and Caruso, and favors non-moral reasons that recommend rejecting a retributivist approach — is divided into three parts. In part one, I discuss why Pereboom and Caruso are correct in thinking that free will skepticism undercuts the moral justification for retributivism. Part two sets out to explain why their moral case against retributivism fails insofar as it runs afoul of the folk intuitions that are called upon to defend Pereboom’s account of free will skepticism. In part three, I provide a non-moral case against the retributivism that is founded on considerations of self-interest and empathy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite being held in something approaching universal esteem for its capacity to promote prosocial behavior and inhibit antisocial behavior, empathy has recently become the recipient of strong criticism from some of today’s leading academics. Two of the more high-profile criticisms of empathy have come from philosopher Jesse Prinz and psychologist Paul Bloom, each of whom challenges the view that empathy has an overall beneficial influence on human behavior. In this essay, I discuss the basis of their criticisms as well as (...) why I am not compelled by their arguments to believe that empathy does more harm than good. In the process of responding to empathy’s critics, I discuss the important role that empathy plays in our moral lives. I argue that, rather than employing rational considerations to minimize the role that empathy plays in our moral and political judgments, such considerations are put to better use by expanding empathy when conducive to the common good and suppressing it when it opposes th... (shrink)

The current system of ethical oversight in the United States is based on Institutional Review Board (IRB) review. The system was established in response to well-known and egregious mistreatment of subjects in both biomedical and social and behavioral research. In the decades since the research regulations were enacted, reaction to the burden of IRB oversight has led the system to focus on compliance and limit its active oversight disproportionately to studies that could present the risk of physical harm. At the (...) same time, the characteristics of the research enterprise have changed and methodologies now present novel risks that were not envisioned in the regulations. We convened a group of IRB professionals, academic leaders, and others to discuss limitations of the current system, how that system could be changed to recognize evolving risks and an increasing focus on participant and community voice, and how it could better serve the needs of researchers and support the societal project of science as a public good. Recommendations included a call to reexamine the academic incentive structure, to develop a system to support consideration of ethical principles from the time of study design, and to explicitly provide different ethical support and oversight for high-risk interventional trials and lower risk biomedical and social behavioral research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism and Christianity: The Meeting PlaceStephen MorrisUnquestionably one of the most intriguing documents unearthed in that explosive discovery at Nag Hammadi fifty years ago is The Gospel According to Thomas. It is exciting on many levels, and for Christians it constitutes both a boon and a challenge.As a ‘sayings collection,’ Thomas purports to offer us the oral teachings of Jesus. Thus it is a godsend not only for Christians (...) but for anyone in the world interested in what Jesus may have actually said.One might expect, however, that a Christian living today, who is imbued with the more traditional or orthodox understanding of what Christianity is all about, would find Thomas challenging. Jesus is presented differently and—equally important—so is his message. But it is not the case that this message is absent in the canonical gospels, only obscured. What Thomas essentially holds is present in Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; but what is highlighted in Thomas is overshadowed in the others by narrative material. Still, if the canonical gospels are bearers of ‘good news,’ then what Thomas heralds is even ‘better news.’What is more is that the Gospel of Thomas must strike Buddhists as remarkable. Christianity is usually presented as centering on Christ (“The whole of Christianity hangs on these words: Christ is God”), 1 and not only discussion but interfaith dialogue almost invariably, from the Christian side, revolve around doctrine. But the focus in Thomas is not at all incompatible with Buddhism, at least as Zen portrays it, as will be shown. Indeed, paradoxically, Thomas—though an ancient Christian text—could conceivably make more sense to modern Zen philosophers than to contemporary Christian theologians.There is something else. John Cobb, engaging in dialogue with the Zen philosopher Masao Abe, has written: “Abe rightly points out that in Christianity there has been a problem about human reason, because it can come into conflict with divine revelation. He notes that Buddhism is free of this problem. Indeed, one of the attractions of Buddhism to Christians and to Westerners generally is that Buddhists seem quite free from the need to defend doubtful doctrines, because of their divinely grounded authority. One of the things Christians have most to gain through dialogue with Buddhists is a similar freedom.” 2 [End Page 19]Cobb’s point here is not insignificant. ‘Doubtful doctrines’ might not at all serve as the healthiest foundation for a spiritual life; and relying on them, taking refuge in them, can easily tend to ensnare rather than liberate the spirit. Many psychologists have pointed this out. For one thing, psychologists decry complacency, which some doctrines can help to foster. Thus, although psychology understands full well the need to develop our psycho-spiritual health on the one hand, it is often critical of religion and how it is practiced on the other.In this paper I intend to examine the Gospel of Thomas in the light of Zen Buddhism. There are three general but crucial areas concerning which Zen philosophers are unmistakably clear and absolutely adamant; and although in these areas Buddhism poses a stark contrast to orthodox Christianity, this is not the case when it comes to Thomas. Instead, Thomas appears to line up right beside Zen on these matters. What is more is that, standing together, Zen and Thomas would not only escape the criticism of modern psychology; they would join in leveling some of the same objections.Thus it seems to me that, while Buddhists would naturally find Thomas a most welcome and interesting document, Christians, could they only bracket the ancient doctrines with which they have been inoculated, would also discover a rich and refreshing version of the Christian message. Indeed, although jolting at first, it might be that Thomas offers a more pertinent, more realistic, and more reasonable presentation than do the canonical gospels themselves.Placing ThomasBefore proceeding it might be worthwhile, in the light of recent scholarship, to generally locate Thomas within the Christian framework. Clearly not orthodox, Thomas was at first assumed to be Gnostic; but that initial appraisal has turned out to be too quick and too casual, and now it is no longer widely held at all... (shrink)

Science and the End of Ethics examines some of the most important positive and negative implications that science has for ethics. Addressing the negative implications first, author Stephen Morris discusses how contemporary science provides significant challenges to moral realism. One threat against moral realism comes from evolutionary theory, which suggests that our moral beliefs are unconnected to any facts that would make them true. Ironically, many of the same areas of science (e.g. evolutionary biology, neuroscience, psychology) that present (...) difficulties for moral realism point to a new ethical approach that focuses on achieving some of the key practical goals shared by ethicists. Chief among these is how to increase amicable behavior among people. (shrink)

By combining normative philosophy and empirical social science, we craft a research framework for assessing differential expectations embodied in normative conceptions of the economic social contract in the United States. We argue that there are distinctviews of such a contract grounded in individualist and communitarian philosophical ideologies. We apply this framework to organizational downsizing, postulating that certain human resource practices, in combination with the respective ideological orientations, will affect perceptions of the justice of downsizing policies.Living up to one’s word is (...) a decisive measure of moral character. Within the microsocial realm of the family, promises and commitments derive their social force and cultural meaning from the idea that love or biology binds people together in an absolute way. But outside of this world, in the larger society, the only thing binding people together is a sense that there is a social contract, a set of common obligations held collectively by society as a whole. But today’s workers say no one seems to care whether these promises are kept. (shrink)

Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...) and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility. (shrink)

Although the concept of HAPPINESS plays a central role in ethics, contemporary philosophers have generally given little attention to providing a robust account of what this concept entails. In a recent paper, Dan Haybron sets out to accomplish two main tasks: the first is to underscore the importance of conducting philosophical inquiry into the concept of HAPPINESS; the second is to defend a particular account of happiness—which he calls the ‘emotional state conception of happiness’—while pointing out weaknesses in the primary (...) competing accounts of happiness, including the hedonistic account. I argue against his claim that the emotional state conception of happiness is superior to the hedonistic conception of happiness. In the course of defending the hedonistic account of happiness against Haybron's attacks, I provide my own explanation for why the study of happiness is important to ethics. (shrink)

In this paper I consider two kinds of approaches that philosophers have used to defend free will against psychologist Daniel Wegner’s claim that neuroscience research indicates that consciousness does not have any causal power over our actions. On the one hand, Eddy Nahmias relies heavily on empirical arguments to challenge Wegner’s conclusions. In contrast, Daniel Dennett employs a conceptual argument based on the idea that Wegner is operating under a mistaken notion of self. After ultimately rejecting the defenses of free (...) will given by both Nahmias and Dennett, I conclude by assessing whether either of the types of approaches taken by these philosophers might eventually yield a viable defense of free will in light of the challenges posed by contemporary neuroscience. (shrink)

While skeptical arguments concerning free will have been a common element of philosophical discourse for thousands of years, one could make the case that such arguments have never been more numerous or forceful than at present. In response to these skeptical attacks, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concern that the widespread acceptance of such skeptical attitudes could have devastating social consequences. In this paper, I set out to address whether such concerns are well-founded. I argue that there is reason (...) to believe that should skeptical arguments result in the widespread dismissal of human free will, the results of such a dismissal are likely to be more positive than negative. (shrink)

Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of (...) surveying people’s prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research. (shrink)